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In September of 2005 seven thousand U.S. and Iraqi soldiers 
massed around the northern Iraqi town of Tall’Afar.  To the chagrin of an 
already battered and thinly stretched military, the town, which is nestled 
along the porous Syrian border, had become a stronghold of the 
insurgency.  Predicted to be this year’s Fallujah and believed to be the 
present haven of al-Qaeda kingpin Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, Tall’Afar 
awaited a smash mouth assault from coalition forces, who would be 
assisted by hundreds of Bradleys, battle tanks, and artillery pieces.  AC-
130 Spectre gunships, F-16 fighter jets, and attack helicopters circled in 
the sweltering sky, anticipating calls from ground forces already 
skirmishing with insurgents in buildings and medieval alleyways laced 
with booby traps and roadside bombs.  Before the decisive assault, Iraqi 
soldiers and the Green Berets attached to their units began “draining the 
pond,” evacuating trapped civilians and keeping a wary eye for 
insurgents attempting to slip out disguised as women or holding 
children’s hands.  However, the two-day grace for civilians to evacuate 
became a four-day standstill, momentum lost to concerns in Baghdad and 
Washington over civilian casualties and other unknown political 
considerations.  When fighting finally resumed many of the insurgents 
had vanished along with most of their dead.  “The insurgency is like a 
cell-phone system,” a high ranking U.S. officer told Time, “You shut 
down one node, another somewhere else comes online to replace it.” 1  
 This illustration provides more than a glimpse into the gritty, inch 
by inch street fights in Iraq; it is a window into the complex nature of 
modern asymmetrical warfare. It now appears as though World War II 
                                                 
1 Michael Ware, “Chasing the Ghosts,” Time, September 26, 2005.   
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era set-piece battles and carpet bombing have been retired to the history 
books.  In contrast, today’s conflicts resemble guerilla warfare in an 
information age.  At a press conference during the campaign in 
Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commented on the 
impact that this type of warfare has on civilian casualties, “The national 
security environment in the world has changed. We are dealing with a 
different margin for error. We are dealing with different penalties that 
will result from our decisions. Whichever decision we make, the 
penalties will be notably different than they were in the last century.”2   
In this national security environment the same information 
component used to target insurgents in Tall’Afar is the same technology 
that instantaneously broadcasts the battle across the globe.  
Consequently, a decisive feature of information age warfare is the power 
of public opinion, and especially the influence of civilian casualties on 
this dynamic.3  For example, the military can tactically win in Tall’Afar, 
but if civilian casualties mount –transmitted by instant graphic journalism 
– it may lose the battle in the media; thus eroding public support, 
undermining political objectives, and perhaps ultimately losing the war.  
Such a situation suggests that in asymmetrical wars political and military 
strategy cannot be separated, thereby adding another twist to the assertion 
by 19th century Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, that, 
“War is politics by other means.” 
 Against this backdrop General Tommy Franks’ terse answer, “We 
don’t do body counts,” which was given at Bagram Air Base to 
journalists’ questions on counting casualties during Operation Anaconda 
in Afghanistan, serves as a portal into the sensitive issue of civilian 
casualties and the controversial debate over counting them.4  Since 
Franks was the top officer in the U.S. Central Command for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, his statement regarding body counts, which has 
been echoed from top officials to ground level officers, seems to reflect 
the position and unofficial policy of the Pentagon on this contentious 
topic.  Moreover, the subtext of those five words – terminology, tone, and 
intended audience – indicate that today’s military is still haunted by 
Vietnam, and thus, the Vietnam war itself acts as the natural embarkation 
point into the development of tensions and policy inside the Pentagon on 
                                                 
2 Cited in WBUR Boston and NPR radio show: The Connection, “Civilian Casualties,” Aired: Aug. 2, 
2002. Listen to program at: http://www.theconnection.org/shows/2002/08/20020802_a_main.asp 
3 Inspired from comments by Kenneth Allard on The Connection, “Civilian Casualties,”  Aug. 2, 2002. 






the complex problem of civilian casualties.   By tracing this subject as it 
originated in Vietnam to the current war in Iraq, one can attain a firm 
understanding of its hitherto uncharted evolution and therefore more 
competently grasp the divisive issues and inherent dilemmas surrounding 
the question of counting civilian casualties, and foresee its implications 
on the current future of modern warfare.   
 The ability of a modern democracy to fight a limited war is quite 
precarious. Like members of the current administration, American 
policymakers in the 1960s recognized this truth.  They understood that 
American public opinion, as Leslie Gelb has put it, was the “essential 
domino” to victory in Vietnam.5  The principle method used by the 
Pentagon to measure the success of its attrition strategy was the “body 
count.”  The body count could palpably demonstrate the progress of the 
war to Congress and the American public.  Since the news media was the 
standard conduit to these audiences, the military viewed its relationship 
with the press as central to sustaining support for the war.  In Saigon 
military officials briefed the press daily with precise tallies of enemy 
casualties; the frequency of which gave some the false impression that 
soldiers spent the night counting bodies by flashlight in range of enemy 
fire.  The body count criterion and the environment it fostered naturally 
led to inflated numbers, including civilians caught in the crossfire.6 
While not uncritical, American media reporting generally 
supported the objectives of the military and administration; however, as 
the political scientist Guenter Lewy points out, “War has always been 
beastly, but the Vietnam War was the first war exposed to television 
cameras and seen in practically every home, often in living color…the 
events of Tet and the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968…shook the American 
public…[and] contributed significantly to disillusionment with the war.”7  
The body counts set against the disturbing months of 1968 shattered the 
credibility of the military and the Johnson administration.  Gallup polls 
indicated that the Tet offensive had dramatically shifted public opinion 
against the war.8  When Walter Cronkite, the CBS nightly news anchor, 
declared the war a stalemate, President Lyndon B. Johnson clearly 
perceived the gravity of this shift when he remarked, “If we’ve lost 
                                                 
5 Leslie H. Gelb, “The Essential Domino: American Politics and Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, (1972): 
459. 
6 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. The Army and Vietnam.  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), 202-205.   
7 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 433-434. 
8 Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 66.   
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Cronkite, we’ve lost America.”9  In the aftermath, an open animosity 
developed between the military and the government on the one side, and 
the news media on the other.  The military believed that 1968 had been a 
decisive victory and held contempt for what it viewed as irresponsible 
reporting and sweeping conclusions.  
Contrary to the military’s perception, William M. Hammond 
argues that even though a considerable number of erroneous and unfair 
reports existed, the majority of Vietnam War reporting “reproduced the 
official point of view.”  Moreover, despite the aberration of poor 
reporting during Tet, the negative, yet largely sound, press coverage 
following the offensive did not so much turn public opinion as reflect an 
American view of the war that had itself begun to change: 
 
Cueing to that trend if not to its sources within the elite, the press 
again followed suit but the U.S. Government and military lacked 
the ability to do the same.  Remaining behind in South Vietnam to 
retrieve whatever national face they could, those of their members 
most emotionally tied to the failed policy fixed their anger upon 
the news media, the most visible exponent of the society that 
appeared to have rejected them.  The recriminations that we see 
today became the most inevitable result.10 
 
Citing the later remarks of generals like William C. Westmoreland, 
commander of American forces in Vietnam, Hammond shows that in 
addition to flawed reporting, this post-Vietnam myth held that the news 
media had relentlessly stovepiped the mayhem of war into the living 
rooms of the American public, thus buckling the people’s will under the 
weight of dismay and defeatism.  Although Hammond uncovers evidence 
contrary to the myth, these discordant beliefs within the military 
establishment have stuck.11   
Not only did the soured relationship with the media have 
repercussions on how the Pentagon handled the issue of civilian 
casualties in the future, but the military tactics employed in Vietnam did 
as well.  The clash of opposing doctrines and tactics, which came to 
characterize both sides of the conflict, engendered the devastating and 
                                                 
9 Sobel, 66. 
10 William M. Hammond, “The Press in Vietnam as Agent of Defeat: A Critical Examination,” 
Reviews in American History 17, no. 2 (June 1989): 318, 321.   
11 Note: Hammond demonstrates that network censorship and the limited mobility of television crews 





unconventional nature of the Vietnam War.  In the jungles and rice 
paddies fought the Viet Cong who “clutched the people to their breast,” 
and the American soldiers who “expended shells not men.”  Against 
fortified Vietnamese hamlets and entrenched Viet Cong positions inside 
cities like Saigon and Hue, the American military employed artillery, 
tactical airpower, naval gunfire, and helicopter gunships.  “The 
unparalleled, lavish use of firepower as a substitute for manpower,” 
wrote an American officer in early 1968, ‘is an outstanding characteristic 
of U.S. Military tactics in the Vietnam war.”12  While this profligate use 
of fire in populated areas contributed to a rising body count, civilian 
casualties also rose from the effects of search and destroy operations, 
free-fire zones, and problematic interpretations of rules of engagement.  
Such a combination proved counterproductive to “winning the hearts and 
minds” of the peasantry.13  Regardless of the source of fault, civilian 
casualties, estimated in the millions, had a significant influence on the 
American citizens’ will to sustain the war.  “Another Vietnam lesson 
learned by both press and military,” says Lucinda Fleeson of the Philip 
Merrill College of Journalism, “was an understanding of the importance 
of civilian casualties.  U.S. military leaders learned the hard way that 
they could not outpace the public’s willingness to accept the human cost 
of conflict…as a result, billions have been spent to refine precision 
weaponry to improve their killing capability and reduce unintended 
casualties.”14  The Pentagon had begun implementing these lessons 
learned since the Vietnam War long before the first salvo of “smart 
bombs” arced over the Iraqi skyline, opening the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  
Clausewitz used the term “center of gravity” to define the core 
source of power from which a military derives its strength.   According to 
Fleeson, the American military judged Iraq’s center of gravity to be 
Saddam Hussein and his Republican Guard.  “The center of gravity in 
America, however, is…the will of the people,” she continues, “often a 
function of citizens’ acceptance of deaths of its own soldiers as well 
as…civilian casualties.”15  Having linked victory with censorship, a bitter 
lesson of the Vietnam War, the daily briefings by military officials in 
Riyadh were heavily filtered, ostensibly for security, but public relations 
concerns as well.  The skeletal details provided to reporters focused more 
                                                 
12 Cited in Lewy, 96. 
13 Ibid, 96, 97, 105. 
14 Lucinda Fleeson, “The Civilian Casualty Conundrum,” American Journalism Review, (April 2002), 
4-5. 
15 Ibid, 4-5. 
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on precision ordnance and sterile targets than the more graphic features 
of war.  The Pentagon also imposed a “pool system” on combat coverage, 
which permitted small numbers of correspondents to forward areas under 
military escort, but subsequent reports had to be cleared by the military.  
Despite genuine efforts by Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin 
Powell to ease the old animosity and suspicions between the military and 
press, the new reporting rules did not sit well with the media.  As 
reported in the New York Times, “However many assurances they are 
given to the contrary, reporters are convinced that senior military 
officers, many of whom think critical reporting destroyed public support 
for the Vietnam War…are determined…to minimize critical reporting 
here.”16   
An important aspect of this censorship was the issue of the body 
count.  Now packaged in the euphemism, collateral damage, the military 
leadership made it clear that the days of tallying casualties, whether 
military or civilian were over.  Using the phrase collateral damage in 
place of civilian casualties, for example, would help sterilize the brutal 
reality of war.  Margot Norris’ research on censorship in the Persian Gulf 
War argues: 
 
The double defeat in Vietnam, military and moral, prompted the 
new body count practice…Shedding the Vietnam syndrome has 
always meant achieving a double power: the ability to win an 
absolute and ‘clean’ military victory by full use of American 
technological superiority, and the ability to win an absolute and 
‘clean’ moral victory by full use of the Pentagon’s virtually 
absolute control over martial necrology.17   
 
One tension that developed within the Pentagon as a result of silence on 
civilian casualty figures was the conflict between proclamations of hi-
tech proficiency against surfacing reports of rising civilian casualties.  In 
her respected study in 1993, Beth Osborne Daponte, a demographer at 
Carnegie Mellon University, estimated that 13,000 civilians were killed 
directly by the U.S.-led campaign in the Persian Gulf.18 
Another major tension that emerged during this war was between 
the pledge to the domestic audience to minimize American military 
                                                 
16 R.W. Apple Jr., “War in the Gulf: Covering the War,” New York Times, Feb. 3, 1991, A9.   
17 Margot Norris, “Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War,” Cultural 
Critique, no. 19, The Economies of War (Autumn, 1991): 237. 





casualties, and the promise to a foreign audience to spare the lives of 
Iraqi civilians.   In the month of bombing that preceded the brief ground 
war, Saddam Hussein, taking a page from Hanoi, deftly publicized 
civilian casualties in an effort to stir Arab street rage and divide European 
public opinion.  He placed military hardware beside sensitive locations 
such as neighborhoods, schools, and hospitals.  In the nascent era of 24 
hour Cable News coverage, epitomized by CNN, the stakes in the battle 
for public opinion soared to new heights.  When American fighter-
bombers released two penetrating 2,000-pound bombs on the Al Firdos 
bunker in February of 1991, the Bush administration had to scramble to 
the airwaves to pre-empt the graphic images of charred civilians that 
began flooding television screens.  Saddam Hussein claimed that the 
building had been an air-raid shelter, while American officials 
maintained that he had stocked a legitimate military target with human 
shields.  Nevertheless, the bombs caused hundreds of civilian casualties.  
Concerned at the time about the fragile coalition and Saddam Hussein’s 
successes on the political battlefront, a Western diplomat told the New 
York Times, “The clear danger is that if civilian casualties mount, the 
President could be in the unseemly position of establishing an equation 
between the value of American lives and the value of Iraqi civilians’ 
lives.”19  
The frequent reporting of civilian casualties and the political 
context of the Gulf War demonstrated that more was required to deal 
with the political effects of events like the Al Firdos bombing in 
Baghdad.  For most of the war the President George H.W. Bush enjoyed 
formidable domestic support and favorable media coverage; Richard 
Sobel says, “The media responded to the established preferences of their 
audience and the goals of the government…both the public and 
politicians were very much opposed to any protests; the media coverage 
followed this pattern.”20  Despite strong domestic backing for the war, the 
Bush administration was persistently concerned about public opinion, 
both at home and abroad, especially among the world’s one billion 
Muslims.  In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. military operated inside a political 
powder keg, and the Al Firdos bombing sparked numerous anti-American 
demonstrations in the Arab world.  As a result, the U.S. leadership 
decided to drastically restrict the bombing of targets in and around 
Baghdad, even though they had adhered to their legal obligations for 
                                                 
19 Andrew Rosenthal, “War in the Gulf: Bush Quandary,” New York Times, Feb. 14, 1991, A1.   
20 Sobel, 155. 
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limiting civilian casualties.  Therefore, political objectives affected 
military strategy and vice versa.  “In assessing targets, if there is a 
possibility of significant civilian deaths, the military gain might be offset 
by the blowback, so they won’t do it,” says defense consultant Richard 
King, a retired Air Force colonel who worked on several Persian Gulf 
War after-action reports.21  A significant consequence was that American 
soldiers, now and in future wars, might face greater risk from a red-taped 
bombing campaign and rules of engagement that would limit the prospect 
of civilian casualties. 
Nonetheless, the Al Firdos incident and several other politically 
tense moments were aberrations.  The U.S. led coalition decimated 
Saddam’s vaunted army in a largely desert theatre, and under ten percent 
of the weapons used were precision guided.  The issue of collateral 
damage and of tallying the civilian cost did not significantly weigh on the 
public conscience because of the swiftness and largely conventional 
nature of the Gulf War.  Press censorship and the promotion of precision 
weapons also influenced this outcome, proving sound lessons learned 
from the Vietnam War.  However, by publicizing a “clean” war, the U.S. 
military raised its own standard for success to which it would be held 
during the next conflict; a battle zone where the landscape might not be 
golden sands, but tribal mountains and crowded streets.   
Given that battlefield conditions and precision weapons technology 
had limited collateral damage in the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military 
was not spurred into a substantial “lessons learned” process with regard 
to damage assessments.  The bombing campaign suffered from what is 
termed an “input-output gap.”  Thomas Keaney, a former Air Force 
colonel and current executive director of the Foreign Policy Institute at 
the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins 
University explains, “The U.S. military encountered a vast discrepancy 
between the amount of knowledge available of the input—for example, 
the number of sorties and bomb tonnage—compared with the output—
the bomb damage.”22 Damage assessments are possible, but they involve 
a difficult process that usually retains some degree of uncertainty.  
Therefore, when military after-action reports addressed the issue of 
collateral damage, as did the Department of Defense’s Title V Report to 
Congress, the focus was on the input of the air operations, such as “target 
                                                 
21 Cited in Fleeson, 5. 
22 See Thomas Keaney’s essay, “Collateral Damage in the Gulf War: Experience and Lessons,” The 
Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government.  Essay available at: 





selection, weapon assignment, and avoidance of religious and 
archeological sites, hospitals, schools, and similar areas.”  Treatment of 
the output side of operations was limited to the Al Firdos incident.  
Rather, the reports focused on the Iraqi regime’s disregard for the laws of 
war and its campaigns of disinformation.  “Overall, the report is correct 
in detailing what was done, but…provided no indication that any lessons 
were learned regarding U.S. obligations in restricting collateral damage,” 
Keaney concludes, “nor did the report deal with collateral damage 
beyond the strict legal obligations involved.”23  While the U.S. military 
was uninterested in conducting collateral damage assessments, they were 
more than cognizant of its political lessons: 
During the war, the United States learned important unstated, but 
obvious lessons concerning the political effects of collateral 
damage…relying on legal expertise was proven insufficient to 
determine the political effects of civilian casualties. That 
responsibility must remain with the commanders at the highest 
levels, who are often civilian leaders in Washington. Such 
conditions will necessarily limit the conduct of military 
operations.24 
 
The political lessons the Pentagon learned during the Gulf War resulted 
in serious investment in the input side of their operations, which 
manifested in meticulous risk assessments, improved technology, and an 
enlarged arsenal of precision weapons.  The Pentagon showcased the 
fruit of these efforts over the skies of Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, and 
hoped to continue the trend into the War on Terror.  Thus, when the 
inevitable question of civilian casualties arose in Afghanistan, Gen. 
Tommy Franks, as cited in the New York Times, called the conflict there, 
“the most accurate war ever fought in this nation’s history.”25  However, 
difficult battlefield conditions and the political context of the War on 
Terror amplified tensions within the Pentagon regarding civilian 
casualties.  Moreover, by neglecting the output side of collateral damage 
and refusing to count the victims, the Pentagon exacerbated the 
controversial issue of civilian casualties that the input investments were 
intended to alleviate.   
                                                 
23 Keaney, “Collateral Damage.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 Eric Schmitt, “After January Raid, Gen. Franks Promises to do Better,” New York Times, Feb. 8, 
2002, A10.   
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Even though the searing images of the terrorist attacks on 
September 11th 2001 provided the United States with an unprecedented 
degree of global sympathy, that solidarity – “we are all Americans” – did 
not necessarily translate into a carte blanch for U.S. military operations.  
The prospect of bombs falling on an impoverished, famine stricken, and 
war ravaged populace did not sit well with the international community, 
especially with the Muslim world that harbored many festering 
grievances with the United States.  From the outset, global support for the 
War on Terror rested on a foundation of sand.  As the first bombing raids 
commenced over Afghanistan in October of 2001, fifty-six Islamic 
nations convened an emergency meeting in Qatar, issuing a careful 
statement condemning the terrorist attacks in New York, and warning 
against American actions that inflicted civilian casualties and extended 
beyond those directly responsible.  Several weeks later, Defense Minister 
Geoff Hoon of Britain met with Secretary Rumsfeld and other top 
officials in Washington. He warned of growing hostility in Islamic 
countries like Pakistan and of unease among staunch allies like Great 
Britain by the increasing reports of civilian bombing casualties.  “People 
are starting to wonder where does this way of waging war bring us?” a 
Western diplomat told the New York Times, “There are no evident 
results…no big Taliban leaders captured or killed. And the collateral 
damage doesn’t make nice pictures in the newspapers.”26  On the home 
front, Americans were more preoccupied with anthrax scares than grainy 
night vision videos of precision bombing.  One administration official 
told the New York Times, “The lesson we’re learning is that you can 
bomb the wrong place in Afghanistan and not take much heat for it. But 
don’t mess up at the post office.”27  Still, civilian and military officials 
recognized that a major mistake in Afghanistan, sealed in newspaper ink, 
could render that political lesson null and void.   
 Winning the information war was critical to shoring up world 
opinion and maintaining domestic support.  In a NewsHour interview 
with Jim Lehrer, Secretary Rumsfeld addressed the issue of civilian 
casualties and informed the American public of the asymmetrical nature 
of the Afghan campaign: 
…what they [Taliban] are doing is they’re taking their tanks and 
their artillery and their various command-and-control centers, 
                                                 
26 Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Campaign On 2nd Front: Public Opinion,” New York 
Times, Oct. 31, 2001, B1.   
27 Elisabeth Bumiller and David E. Sanger, “Home Front is a Minefield for President,” New York 





they’re using mosques, they’re using hospitals, schools and 
residential areas…it’s a win-win for them. Either we don’t bomb 
them because they’re in a mosque, in which case they’re safe. Or if 
we do bomb them, they bring the press in there with a bus and their 
cameras and take pictures and say what terrible people the 
westerners are who are doing this.28 
 
When pressed about civilian casualties on the ground, Mr. Rumsfeld 
emphasized the precision of American ordnance, but acknowledged that 
rare mistakes do occur.  He again underscored the Taliban’s complicity in 
collateral damage and its propaganda campaign, as demonstrated by 
removing civilians from hospitals and planting them in an area where 
American bombs had recently fallen.  Therefore, it is apparent that since 
Vietnam, the Pentagon had learned that a clear public relations strategy 
was an essential companion of military strategy.  
While the Pentagon was quick to defend itself before the American 
public, they were slow to realize the power that satellite networks had 
over an international audience, particularly over the Arab public, which 
often woke up to the claims of the Taliban rather than press conferences 
hosted by Secretary Rumsfeld.  “We have been hearing from Arab 
leaders and others who support us who say you guys need to do more,” a 
senior administration official told the New York Times, “They say, ‘Al 
Jazeera is killing us.’”29  As a result, officials like General Richard 
Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State 
Colin Powell gave interviews to Arab networks, clarifying American 
objectives and countering the Taliban’s dramatic collateral damage 
estimates.   
In such an incendiary political atmosphere, the Pentagon circled 
the wagons around the enduring issue of tallying civilian casualties—a 
trend epitomized by Gen. Tommy Franks’ famous declaration: “We don’t 
do body counts.”  William H. Arkin, a former army intelligence analyst 
and current military adviser to Human Rights Watch, told the New York 
Times, “The military knows they’ll get pummeled about issues relating to 
civilian casualties, and they don’t have a clue how to address it in a 
nonpropagandistic way. The subject ties them in knots. It’s an irritant, 
                                                 
28 See Rumsfeld television interview with Jim Lehrer on Nov. 7, 2001. Transcript available at 
www.pbs.org. 
29 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Tries to Sway Worldwide Opinion in Favor of War,” New York Times, 
Nov. 6, 2001, A1. 
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and they avoid it.”30  This intransigence aggravated by the consistent 
needling of the American media further isolated the Pentagon from the 
subject.  “Journalists, like nature, abhor a vacuum,” said Stephen Hess, a 
scholar of the presidency at the Brookings Institution in Washington. 
With an incessant need for information, especially for 24-hour cable 
networks, he continued, “The story consequently becomes about whether 
the coalition will hold together, or civilian casualties.”31  The friction 
between the Pentagon and the American press undermined the military’s 
effort to prevent political fallout resulting from rumors of collateral 
damage and actual mistakes.   
The nature of the War on Terror – guerilla warfare in an 
information age – heightened the tension between the Pentagon’s refusal 
to count collateral damage and the increasing reports of civilian 
casualties; a tension that had developed in the Gulf War.  By restricting 
the news media’s access in Afghanistan, the Pentagon isolated journalists 
who could have corroborated its claims. “I think there have not been very 
many civilian casualties,” Steven Inskeep of NPR told Lucinda Fleeson, 
“But when the Pentagon tells you there have not been civilian casualties, 
they have not given you enough access so that reporters can repeat that 
statement with confidence.”32  In addition, a hostile and extremely rugged 
countryside made independent verification a slow and dangerous process; 
many journalists were virtually stranded in Afghanistan’s squalid hotels.  
While conservative groups accused the media of lacking patriotism and 
being overly negative toward the government, others accused the media 
of being sluggish to report on U.S. military blunders and civilian 
casualties.  Compared with international media outlets, which reported 
hundreds, even thousands of civilian deaths, the accusations against the 
American press seemed credible.  However, American reporters 
generally have more rigorous standards than their peers across the 
Atlantic.  Loren Jenkins, NPR’s senior foreign editor, was quoted by 
Lucinda Fleeson, “Only go with what you know yourself, for sure. I 
learned that lesson in Vietnam.”  33   
While the Pentagon refused to count civilian casualties and as war 
correspondents slowly pieced collateral damage stories together, two 
academics filled the void with studies that estimated the number of 
                                                 
30 Barry Bearak, Eric Schmitt and Craig Smith, “Uncertain Toll in the Fog of War,” New York Times, 
Feb. 10, 2002, Section 1, pg.1. 
31 David E. Sanger and Jim Rutenberg, “Bush Plans Speeches with Coherent, Unified Message,” New 
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32 Fleeson, 5. 





civilians killed in Afghanistan.  The studies by Marc W. Herold of the 
University of New Hampshire and by Carl Conetta, director of the 
Project on Defense Alternatives, reported deaths into the thousands; 
however, Lucinda Fleeson questions their methodology: 
 
They ultimately resembled a global version of the game of 
telephone: a refugee says that eight villagers died in an attack; 
Taliban officials transmute that report into 30 casualties; that claim 
is posted on a Pakistani news agency’s Web site; six other Web-
based news services pick up the figure; a British newspaper 
includes the claim in its news of the day out of Afghanistan; an 
American professor counts up all of these reports over three 
months and concludes that 3,767 civilians had been killed.34 
 
By the time the Associated Press concluded an onsite reconstruction they 
had cautiously estimated the total between 500 and 600 civilian deaths.  
Regardless of aggregate numbers, scholars like Herold and Conetta 
insisted that the magnitude of the figures belied the Pentagon’s claims of 
“the most accurate war ever fought in this nation’s history.”  Pentagon 
officials like Secretary Rumsfeld have maintained that tracking civilian 
casualties is “next to impossible,” citing the inaccessibility of bombed 
targets, the Muslim tradition of promptly burying the dead, and the 
amount of time that elapses before it would be safe to conduct 
investigations.35   
 Thus, the Pentagon preferred to deflect charges of collateral 
damage with detailed descriptions of their targeting process in 
Afghanistan.  The New York Times reported: 
 
The Pentagon has used multiple sources of intelligence, including 
local Afghans, U-2 spy planes, reconnaissance satellites, unpiloted 
Predator drones and RC-135 Rivet Joint planes that collect 
electronic transmissions. Sources are crosschecked for accuracy.  
Commanders then determine which aircraft to dispatch, the type 
and size of the bomb, and even the best approach route to 
minimize the threat to civilians. Lawyers review the targets, also 
evaluating the risk to civilians.36 
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And if the targets are deemed particularly risky, clearance must come 
from the Secretary of Defense, and even the President.  However, such 
championing of the input side of operations led to unintentional 
credibility gaps and serious political problems.  
The tragic events of July 1, 2002 highlighted the fact that military 
operations can be precise, but not correct.  In the black night of the 
Oruzgan Province, American Special Forces reported antiaircraft fire 
coming from the four villages of the hamlet of Kakrak.  Soon an AC-130 
gunship hovered over the villages and the pilots reported being fired on.  
Having received clearance, the gunship, bristling with cannons and 
Gatling gun, strafed the hamlet.  Daylight revealed villagers gathering the 
limbs of their neighbors suspended in trees and scattered on the ground.  
Locals told reporters that there had been two engagement parties that 
night and the men had fired their guns in the air, an Afghan celebratory 
tradition.  Afghan officials counted dozens of dead women and children, 
and over a hundred wounded villagers.  Under the ensuing political 
storm, a team of American officials were dispatched to the village to 
investigate.  Angry Afghans, both peasants and officials, decried the U.S. 
military’s reliance on bad intelligence and lavish firepower.  “The 
Americans are not from here and they don’t know our traditions or our 
enemies and who has enemies,” Jan Muhammad, the governor of 
Oruzgan, told the New York Times.37 
 Precision weapons cannot always prevent political fallout.  The 
military’s scrupulous preplanning was very effective against fixed 
targets, but problems arose in the case of emerging targets, such as the 
strike in Kakrak, which are time critical and often based on incomplete or 
dubious intelligence.  A credibility gap developed from these emerging 
target missions; officials who had quickly claimed success soon appeared 
to be discredited when later accounts contradicted their claims.  
Moreover, the Pentagon often continued to insist that no mistakes had 
been made in light of conflicting evidence.38   
On the Boston radio show, The Connection, Thomas Keaney 
addressed host Anthony Brooks’ question about the incident at Kakrak 
and collateral damage.  His response indicated that mistakes will always 
                                                 
37 Dexter Filkins, “Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead,” New York Times, July 2, 
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occur in war, whether they be bad intelligence, misidentification of a 
target, or seeing something that wasn’t there.  The era of precision 
technology has not dissipated the fog of war.  Although the military 
makes an extraordinary effort to avoid collateral damage, the complexity 
of battle and the necessary split second decisions will result in 
misjudgments; one must always “cite the conditions.”39  Nonetheless, 
Sara Sewall, a program director at Harvard University's Carr Center for 
Human Rights, and also a guest on the radio show wondered if, despite 
excellent pre-planning and good intentions, the military is doing 
everything it can to prevent civilian casualties:  
This is an issue that occupies an extraordinary amount of the top 
political and military leadership’s time, yet they respond to it 
defensively as a matter of crisis management; reflexively conduct 
an investigation and move on.  In classic Washington bureaucratic 
terms, no body “owns this problem.” No body is undertaking a 
systematic and comprehensive [and] proactive approach to helping 
us do better…happens in pockets, ad hoc…isn’t institutionalized as 
a whole in the U.S. military.40   
 
In the absence of collateral damage assessments done by the U.S. 
military, nongovernmental groups like Human Rights Watch stepped into 
the vacuum.  Having previously documented collateral damage in the 
1991 Gulf War and 1999 Yugoslav air campaign, William Arkin, an 
expert on civilian casualties, headed a team of investigators that traveled 
to Afghanistan in March of 2002.  The 65-page report that followed cited 
the military’s use of cluster bombs in or near populated areas as a major 
cause of civilian casualties.  The high dud rates of cluster munitions 
turned them into dormant landmines that also posed a threat to civilians 
for years to come.  Despite new technology and greater military 
restriction of cluster bomb targets in Afghanistan, the report still deemed 
the weapon fundamentally flawed.41 
 In 2003, Human Rights Watch again trailed the U.S. military into 
Iraq.  The group soon compiled two detailed reports.  The first report, 
published in October of that year, focused on the conduct of U.S. ground 
forces in Iraq.  “The cases we documented in this report reveal a pattern 
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of over-aggressive tactics, excessive shooting in residential areas and 
hasty reliance on lethal force,” said Joe Stork, acting executive director of 
the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch.  For 
example, part of the problem was assigning combat troops to essentially 
law enforcement tasks.42  The second HRW report, which followed in 
December, also blamed the use of cluster munitions in residential areas 
for unnecessary civilian casualties, but this time it specifically implicated 
the U.S. Army and noted that the U.S. Air Force had “progressively used 
fewer cluster bombs in populated areas.” Known as the “decapitation 
strategy,” the report mentioned 50 air strikes on the Iraqi leadership, or 
“deck of cards,” that failed to eliminate any of their intended targets, 
killing dozens of civilians in the process.  In addition, the report cited the 
unorthodox tactics of Iraqi forces, such as using human shields, hiding 
military hardware in mosques and hospitals, and donning civilian 
clothes.43 
 What was not understood at the time was that those tactics were a 
cruel omen of the raging insurgency later encountered by the U.S. 
military in towns like Tall’Afar.  The particularly virulent, asymmetrical 
nature of the Iraq War exponentially raised the stakes for the political and 
military leadership in regard to collateral damage.  Like the Afghan 
campaign, the Pentagon continued a policy of distance and deflection on 
the topic of civilian casualties.  Casualty estimates conducted by the Iraqi 
Body Count group and the Lancet study tossed numbers into the political 
atmosphere; thus, further eroding the integrity of the Pentagon in the eyes 
of the global public.  These and other political tensions not only 
threatened to undermine public support for the war, but also endangered 
the key object for any conflict like the one in Iraq, the battle for the 
“Hearts and Minds” of the Iraqi populace.    
 Guerilla warfare in the information age has made the subject of 
civilian casualties more significant and yet more complex since the “body 
count” days of Vietnam.  The presence of a high-tech and global media 
on today’s asymmetrical battlefields has not so much illuminated new 
horrors, as it has graphically projected to a wider audience the wrenching 
dilemmas’ inherent in any war.  The following story offers a personal 
glimpse into one such dilemma.  
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In the winter of 2003, Marc Garlasco sat inside a cubicle, deep 
within the corridors of the Pentagon.  As chief of high value targeting, he 
was a key planner in the tracking and assassination of Iraq’s “deck of 
cards.”  On that day he watched a black and white screen transmitting 
images from a Predator drone as it hovered above the presumed location 
of Chemical Ali.  Within seconds the house erupted, and the drone 
recorded the heat signatures of bodies as they flailed in the air.  Marc and 
his co-workers congratulated each other on the elimination of a man who 
was directly responsible for the deaths of thousands.  In April, Marc left 
the Pentagon, deciding to follow his wife to her new job in New York.  
Within a few weeks of leaving the Department of Defense, Human 
Rights Watch had hired Marc as a senior military analyst.  A few days 
later he flew to Baghdad to study what types of attacks had caused the 
highest human death tolls.  Having planned many of the strikes he was 
now investigating, the trip had a particular personal significance.  In 
some cases, U.S. missiles had collapsed a target building while only 
shattering the glass of neighboring structures.   However, on this 
occasion, Marc stood inside a bomb crater in the city of Basra.  Beside 
him stood a 70 year old man who explained that the rubble was all that 
remained of the seventeen members of his family, including all his 
grandchildren.  The missile had been intended for Chemical Ali, but he 
had never been to that house.  Marc shook his head.  He had done 
everything right; the meticulous pre-planning, the correct weaponneering, 
and the precise timing.44   
What the preceding pages—and Marc’s story in particular—have 
attempted to show is that despite today’s technological wonders, war 
remains an awful enterprise.  Moreover, the Pentagon’s over-reliance on 
technology and its insular policy regarding civilian casualties on the one 
hand, and the critics’ calls for better intelligence, restrictive rules of 
engagement, and public casualty tallies on the other, walk a thin line of 
simplistic black and white solutions in a wartime environment of gray 
dilemmas.  If the controversial topic of civilian casualties affords little 
resolution for an ongoing war, then perhaps its sad truths may give pause 
for somber contemplation before the next one.  
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